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A central policy concern since the onset of the Greek debt crisis in 2010 has been whether sovereign debt restructurings trigger credit default swaps (CDS). For the first time since AIG threatened to default on its CDS in 2008, the Greek debt crisis returned CDS to the global spotlight. The question of whether sovereign debt restructurings trigger CDS matters not only for buyers and sellers of CDS, but for financial stability more generally. While there was universal agreement that a failure to pay when due would trigger a failure to pay credit event under CDS, whether formally ‘voluntary’ restructurings also trigger a credit restructuring event was uncertain prior to the Greek debt restructuring in March 2012. 
For a long time, Eurozone policymakers sought to squeeze the Greek debt restructuring through the shifting CDS quicksand, and avoid a credit event under CDS at all costs. This desire to avoid a payout on Greek CDS was a central motivation why Eurozone policymakers opted for a ‘voluntary’ restructuring of Greek debt in July 2011.​[2]​ They reinforced this strategy in October 2011 by calling for a ‘voluntary’ reduction of 50 percent of the net present value on privately held Greek debt.​[3]​ When Greece and the Eurozone implemented the formally voluntary Greek restructuring in February 2012, Greece proposed substantially higher losses for private sector holders than those contemplated back in the summer of 2011, with the aim of reducing Greece’s outstanding indebtedness to around 120 percent of its GDP. 
Eurozone policymakers were concerned that triggering CDS would open up an additional channel of contagion running from sovereign financial distress to instability in the financial sector. CDS protection sellers on Greek debt may be unable to deliver on their promises, leading to a potential chain reaction across the financial system more broadly.​[4]​ The chief concern of policymakers was that a systemically important seller of CDS on Greece, such as AIG in the case of Lehmann Brothers, might fail to deliver on its CDS promises. Their risk-aversion is due to the potentially systemic consequences of triggering CDS on Greek debt. They preferred the certainty of exposing the holders of Greek debt to substantial losses over the uncertainty of having random institutions in the official and shadow banking sector fall prey to their exposures to Greek sovereign CDS. 
Others considered that the fears of systemic consequences of CDS as accelerators of financial instability were overdone, most prominently the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA).​[5]​ The Economist called the belief that triggering Greek CDS would produce ‘Lehman-like market paralysis‘ erroneous. The danger of triggering sovereign CDS was a market bogeyman.​[6]​ At least in hindsight, this view proved to be correct. The declaration of a credit restructuring event following the Greek restructuring in March 2012 did not cause market turmoil, because it was widely anticipated and because the net volume of CDS on Greece debt was comparatively small at around 4 billion €. However, this foresight requires an important qualification. There could have been considerably more turmoil in case of a restructuring eighteen months earlier when the Greek debt crisis first erupted. 
The design ultimately chosen for the Greek debt restructuring in February/March 2012 was a belated recognition that no sustainable restructuring solution existed for Greece that avoided triggering CDS. Under the parameters established by the Troika, Greece needed too much debt relief from the private sector for a restructuring to be feasible without important elements of coercion. Eurozone policymakers realized that the price to pay for insisting on a CDS-immune restructuring would have been too high in terms of free-riding by creditors and Greek debt sustainability. It would have likely led to even higher crisis resolution costs to Greek and European taxpayers further down the road. And policymakers in the end anticipated that the use of retroactive collective action clauses (CACs) would trigger CDS. 
With the benefit of the experience on the Greek restructuring February/March 2012, this article assesses how likely five types of restructuring, ranging from a simple bond exchange over the use of CACs to exit consent are to trigger CDS. The paper is structured into five parts. Part I outlines techniques for restructuring sovereign debt; Part II describes how CDS work and the challenges they raise in debt restructurings. Part III examines the most important credit event in the context of sovereign debt restructurings, the restructuring credit event. Part IV analyses whether five different types of sovereign debt restructurings techniques trigger CDS. Finally, Part V examines the central role of ISDA determinations committees.    

I.	Sovereign debt restructuring techniques
	To achieve success in a restructuring, debtor governments often use implicit threats to suspend payments or to restructure the debt by statute in the absence of 'voluntary' agreement. By reference to its inability to pay, a government hint that absent a 'voluntary' restructuring resulting in an overall net present value reduction of its outstanding indebtedness, it would in due course be forced to suspend payment – an outcome that would be considerably worse in terms of payoffs for creditors as a group. It may also entice creditors into a restructuring by committing only to pay the restructured debt, intimating that non-participating creditors will suffer a default. The mere threat can be highly effective in encouraging participation, and may be just enough to achieve a voluntary restructuring on the proposed term, while avoiding a formal default. 
	Argentina in 2005 used a carrot-and-stick approach to encourage participation in bond exchange. The country sent its creditors the unambiguous message that the exchange offer was indeed final, and would not be improved upon. First, it used a most favoured creditor clause. Second, the Argentinean Congress barred the government from granting better treatment to non-participating creditors in the future (the so-called lock-out law)​[7]​ – a prohibition on more favourable treatment of creditors that chose to remain outside the restructuring. In 2010, Argentina carried out a second restructuring, in an attempt to mop up a large part of the remaining holdout creditors, on very similar terms to the 2005 restructuring. 
Similarly, Greece's restructuring in February/March 2012, though formally 'voluntary', was underpinned by the retroactive insertion and later invocation of collective action clauses into debt instruments issued by Greek law. The Greek and other Eurozone governments, as well as the European Central Bank, leaned on private lenders to tender in the exchange. In return for giving up their existing instruments, holder of Greek debt were offered a package of new bonds issued by Greece (31.5 € for every 100 €), bonds by the European Financial Stability Facility (15 for every 100 €)  and GDP-linked securities. 
‘Voluntary' in the context of sovereign debt restructurings is somewhat of an oxymoron.​[8]​ It is an ill-defined slogan, a catch-all-phrase for ‘marked-based' restructuring techniques that involve obtaining the agreement of a qualified majority of holders without the debtor country resorting to measures that rely on sovereign powers in one form or another. Gulati and Zettelmeyer define the 'principle of voluntariness' as 'the promise (explicit or implicit) to continue paying creditors regardless of whether they take part in a restructuring or 'hold out.' They call for giving up the current 'fixation with 'voluntary' restructurings'.​[9]​ No sovereign debt restructuring in response to a fundamental debt sustainability problem is 'voluntary' in the sense that creditors are only paid part of their promised consideration, under the express or implicit threat of an even worse outcome should they remain outside the restructuring. The voluntary-coercive dimension is a continuum. 
The US Second Circuit’s decision on the credit restructuring definition under the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement in relation to Argentina’s sovereign debt restructuring in 2001 illustrates that there are degrees of voluntariness/coercion.​[10]​ The court underscored the need to look beyond the formal criterion whether all holders were bound to accept the restructuring. It declined to look exclusively at whether a restructuring was binding on all holders, but instead looked at the substance of the restructuring and its economic effect. It held that Argentina's de jure voluntary restructuring in 2001 could not be deemed to be a 'voluntary' restructuring, thereby triggering CDS on Argentina.
Two broad types of sovereign restructuring techniques may be distinguished. The first type comprises those techniques that involve changes to the terms of the debt instruments. The second concerns those restructuring techniques where the debtor state leaves the terms of the existing debt instruments unchanged.​[11]​ 
A leading example of a restructuring without changes to the terms of the debt is the bond exchange. Pakistan in 2001 and Argentina in 2005 carried out such exchanges.​[12]​ In a bond exchange, the debtor country offers its existing bondholders to exchange old for new bonds with different payment terms, such as bonds with longer maturity, a lower interest rate or reduced principal payments. Creditors can formally choose whether or not to tender their bonds, though they may suffer other disadvantages if the decline to participate. 
In 1998, Russia offered holders of rouble-denominated government debt (GKOs) a conversion into bonds denominated in Euros at longer maturities.​[13]​ In nominal terms, creditor claims were reduced by 95 percent. Russia carried out this restructuring through a series of regulations. De jure, however, the exchange took place on a voluntary basis. A law of December 1998 stipulated that debt service of non-converted bonds would be made on designated escrow accounts - a method of discharging the debt that was not foreseen in the original GKO terms. The Russian debt restructuring was rare in that if covered only debt issued in local currency and under local law. It was selective in singling out creditors holding domestic debt for the restructuring. Eurobonds governed by English law, which accounted for a small percentage of Russian debt that were untouched by the restructuring.

Debt restructurings with changes to the terms of the debt often involve a qualified majority of creditors modifying key financial terms, such as maturity, face value, interest rate. Collective action clauses, an increasingly popular restructuring technique, are the most important way to bring about such changes. With the help of a supermajority of participating creditors, CACs can, be used to impose changes of key payment terms on all creditors. All Eurozone government bonds will include CACs from 2013 onwards.​[14]​ CACs are thus likely going to the instrument of choice for restructurings involving debt instruments issued after June 2013 by member States of the European Union, and beyond. 
 
Creditors rarely accept to give up parts of their claims, without at least some implicit threat of sanctions for non-cooperative behaviour. As a result, sovereign debt restructuring practice has developed a flexible toolbox to provide strong incentives for cooperative behaviour. To achieve a high participation rate, debtor countries typically provide a range of economic incentives to creditors, encouraging them to participate in the restructuring. A proposal for a voluntary restructuring is ordinarily deemed to have been successful when a critical mass of creditors, typically 90 percent or more, accepts to restructure on the proposed terms. This informal threshold results from the IMF‘s lending into arrears policy and established sovereign debt restructuring practice. 
Past experience with sovereign debt restructurings suggest that sovereign debt restructurings require a combination of sticks and carrots to work. Virtually every successful sovereign debt restructuring involves an implicit threat of a worse outcome for creditors who choose not to participate in the restructuring, especially an implicit threat that non-participating creditors will not be paid in full. In 1999, for example, Pakistan offered to exchange existing Eurobonds, governed by English law, with new Eurobonds with longer maturities. The exchange prospectus left no doubt that Pakistan's offer would be the only one on the table.​[15]​ Implicitly, the offer sent an even stronger message: accepting the offer was the only way for bondholders to be paid. 
Exit consents are a second important tool for modifying debts. In a debt restructuring with exit consents, the debtor country first offers creditors to exchange old for new debt instruments. When voting on the exchange offer, the creditors modify non-key financial terms just as they exit the old bonds (hence the name, exit consents). The so amended old bonds usually are less attractive to hold, relative to the new debt. Exit consents thereby create strong incentives for participation in the debt restructuring. They can only be used if the bonds provide for majority voting on non key financial terms. If unanimity is required for any change to the terms of the debt instruments, exit consents are ineffectual. 
The use of exit consents is limited to bonds under New York law. With this technique, a majority (typically 50-80 percent) of creditors modifies the non key financial terms of the bonds, such as the waiver of immunity, the place of listing, cross-default clauses and negative pledges - provisions that provide a degree of legal protection to creditors. As a result of such modifications to non-key payment terms, the old bonds become less attractive to hold, despite unchanged payment terms and covenants. Their tradability, liquidity and the holder‘s legal protections may decrease - all factors that render them less attractive in financial terms. 
Before Section III examines the restructuring credit event for CDS in more detail, Section II turns to the operation of CDS more generally and their effect on creditor behaviour in debt restructurings.

II. 	Credit Default Swaps 

CDS are insurance-like financial products whereby a protection seller agrees to pay the protection buyer in case of a credit event on a reference entity in return for a premium over a defined period of time.​[16]​ As a mechanism for creditors to hedge against the default of a debtor, CDS are financial instruments to redistribute risk, or, according to their defenders, to shift risk onto those entities willing and capable of bearing such risks. Unlike traditional insurance that is subject to substantial oversight and regulation at the domestic level, there are no regulatory restrictions as to who may write CDS against credit events, though in practice concerns about counterparty risk and the large average size of CDS transactions limit the class of protection sellers. Many financial market participants, ranging from global financial institutions over hedge funds to smaller regional banks, have dabbled in sovereign CDS over the last decade.
The size of the global market for CDS on corporate and sovereign reference entities amounted to about US$ 32 trillion in mid-2011.​[17]​ One has to distinguish gross and net figures, with the latter figure cancelling out cross-exposures with respect to the same reference entity. Even though the gross volume of CDS written on Greece was said to have been as large as US$80 billion, the net volume amounted only to around US$4 billion.​[18]​ Notwithstanding, there was concern that a larger entity could fail as a result of having acted as a counterparty to CDS transactions with respect to Greece. If such counterparty risk had materialize, it could have lead to cascading losses in the broader financial system, much higher than the net figures on Greek CDS trades would suggest. 
The legal framework for CDS transactions is largely standardized. More than 90 percent of CDS transactions are based on the ISDA Master Agreement.​[19]​ Details on the credit events are found in the 2003 Definitions and the May 2003 Supplement. These boilerplate credit events are the same across most CDS, ensuring their easy tradeability. For sovereign borrowers in the European Union, three credit events are common: restructuring, failure to pay and repudiation/moratorium (but, in contrast, to corporate reference entities, not bankruptcy). 
The Big Bang and Small Bang Protocols of April and July 2009 incorporate the 2009 ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees, Auction Settlement and Restructuring Supplement (DC Supplement) in existing and future CDS.​[20]​ The most important changes concern the auction process and the creation of specialized dispute resolution bodies under the auspices of ISDA, the Determinations Committees (DCs). Among other competencies, they are competent to determine whether credit events have occurred. Their role and concerns about how they operate is examined in further detail below in Section V below.  
The function of CDS
CDS can function both as an insurance-like product and an outright bet on a debtor’s creditworthiness.​[21]​ This twin role prompted a heated discussion on whether a ban on naked CDS, where the protection buyer does not own the reference entity's underlying security, would be desirable.​[22]​ Mainstream defenders of CDS argue that CDS are an important tool to shift risks to those who desire such exposure and are better capable of withstanding credit events (‘the benign theory').​[23]​ However, the view originally championed by Warren Buffett, holds that instead of reducing risk or simply changing the allocation of risk, CDS and derivates more generally, amplify the level of risk in the global financial system, often in unforeseen directions (‘the WMD theory').​[24]​
In relation to the role of sovereign CDS in the Eurozone crisis, one view holds that speculative trading in the CDS market, especially in the form of naked sovereign CDS contributed to a confidence crisis in certain sovereign bond markets, fuelling a negative feedback loop between rising bond yields and widening CDS spreads.​[25]​ Some draw the conclusion that only those with an insurable interest should be allowed to hold CDS protection. Inversely, others are concerned that such limitations on the use of CDS could decrease liquidity in the CDS market, and increase sovereign borrowing costs.​[26]​ In 2011, the European Union decided to ban naked CDS transactions from November 2012, subject to an important exception on a country-by-country basis. 
	CDS cover credit events only for a limited period of time, often five years. They protect creditors against certain credit risks, but not market risk, such as an interest rate increase or changing perceptions among investors of a country‘s creditworthiness. Conceptually, credit and market risk can be neatly distinguished, but in practice the dividing line is difficult to draw. Should certain credit events occur, the protection seller is required to pay the protection buyer the difference between the referenced amount of debt and the market value of the affected debt, nowadays typically determined by auction.​[27]​ In consideration for a premium, the protection seller assumes the credit risk, without any change to the creditor-debtor relationship between the protection buyer and the reference entity. The protection seller posts collateral on a daily basis, varying with the mark-to-market value of the CDS.​[28]​ How much collateral is required depends on the details of a given CDS and the credit risk represented by the counterparty.​[29]​ 
	If a credit event occurs, CDS transactions are settled between the protection buyer and the protection seller. Settlement is either physical or in cash.​[30]​ In physical settlements, the protection buyer delivers the referenced obligation to the protection buyer, and is indemnified by the protection seller. Conversely, in cash settlements, the protection buyer receives the difference between the principal of the obligation and the market price of the security – as determined by an auction overseen whose parameters are set by the competent DC.

Empty creditors
Creditors may behave differently in a world with CDS. CDS protected creditors may drag their feet in restructuring negotiations, and their leverage in negotiations is likely to increase.​[31]​  CDS can unbundle creditor cash flow rights from control rights. In such cases, the economic incidence of a loss is divorced from control right. Creditors hedged by virtue of CDS can expect to be made whole, even if the restructuring negotiations fail or the debtor defaults. CDS protect creditors against the downside of default - all while continuing to vest control rights in those creditors that own a debt security from the reference entity concerned. These ‘empty’ creditors retain the decision whether or not to participate in a debt restructuring and on what terms. 
Marconi‘s restructuring in 2001 is a good example of how CDS can modify the behaviour of some creditors in restructuring negotiations. Creditors covered by CDS blocked a proposed early refinancing plan that provided that they give up their CDS protection under the plan.​[32]​ In Abitibi Bowater, some creditors protected by CDS were unreceptive to a refinancing plan to improve the debtor company’s cash flow position. At least some of the creditors concerned had obtained CDS coverage, and their interests differed materially from creditors without hedges.​[33]​ 
Bolton and Oehmke argue that in at least some corporate restructurings CDS protected creditors were less likely than those without such protection to agree to debt restructurings.​[34]​ Creditors might prefer to collect on their CDS rather than engage in restructuring negotiations. They identify an important trade-off. The inefficiency that may result from creditors covered by CDS being excessively tough in restructuring negotiations ex post may be offset by the ex ante commitment benefit of increasing the debtor’s borrowing capacity. CDS protected creditors also enjoy de facto preferential treatment in bankruptcy by being exempted from the automatic stay, and by being paid preferentially on the basis of netting, closeout and collateralization provisions.​[35]​
Traditionally, CDS protection buyers physically deliver the underlying security (which the protection buyer either owned prior to entering into the CDS transaction or bought on the secondary market at a later stage), in return for the CDS payout. Prior to delivering the security to the protection seller, protection buyers are empty creditor in that they have no economic downside but remain the legal owner of the security. As CDS protection buyers increasingly did not own the underlying security (naked CDS), cash settlement became more popular. In the Greek restructuring, a large percentage of CDS was cash settled.​[36]​ Here the value of the underlying security which the CDS protection buyer has never in fact owned is determined by auction prior to settlement. Unlike with covered CDS, voting rights and economic ownership are always bundled with naked CDS transactions because there is no security underlying the CDS transaction. 
This difference between physical delivery and cash delivery is illustrated in Figure 1. 


Figure 1: The Empty Creditor Problem: Physical Delivery vs. Cash Delivery
The empty creditor problem arises only with respect to covered CDS transactions, that is where the CDS protected creditor owns the underlying security of the reference entity concerned. It also arises only in relation to CDS transactions that are settled by physical delivery and persists only as long the settlement remains outstanding. Settlement re-bundles the incidence of economic loss and legal ownership of the security. Settlement on CDS transactions also typically takes place within 10-15 days of when a credit event occurred.​[37]​ 
In practice, this implies that the scope for recalcitrant empty creditors to undermine restructurings or bankruptcy proceedings is narrower than commonly acknowledged.​[38]​ In the Greek restructuring, however, the expedited auction to settle CDS transactions took place on 19 March 2012, whereas the period for Greece's creditor to tender in the exchange closed on March 9. On the same day, the DC affirmed that a credit restructuring event had occurred. There was thus scope for CDS to influence creditor behaviour, especially prior to March 9 when there was uncertainty of whether the CDS would pay out.   
The empty creditor problem arises only in relation to covered CDS transactions that are cash-settled and only prior to settlement of the CDS transaction concerned, as summarized in Figure 2.  
	Naked CDS	Covered CDS
Cash Settlement	x	Empty Creditor Problem
Physical Settlement	x	x
Figure 2: Incidence of the Empty Creditor Problem
A first way of alleviating the empty creditor problem is to require creditors to disclose their CDS hedges in bankruptcy. This lessens the risk that CDS covered creditors disrupt the bankruptcy process due to conflicts of interest.​[39]​ A second, and more direct way of tackling the empty creditor problem is to require that voting rights should follow the economic incidence of the loss by disenfranchising fully hedged in bankruptcy. Empty creditor are thus prevented from holding the restructuring process hostage based on strategic considerations in light of their hedges.​[40]​ Third, and as already mentioned, the empty creditor problem may be short-lived and occur only in limited circumstances. It will typically become moot long before a formal corporate bankruptcy process is concluded, as CDS settlement almost invariably precedes voting in bankruptcy.​[41]​ In the specific context of sovereign debt restructurings, however, the absence of a formal restructuring framework and the preference for ad hoc negotiations imply that the 
A fourth alternative is to include a comprehensive credit restructuring credit event in CDS. Compared to a world without CDS, this is a second best solution. Overall, the level of creditor cooperation is likely to decrease because CDS insulate the creditor from the downside of a default. However, the absence of a restructuring credit event could worsen the collective action problem in financial distress.​[42]​ If CDS protection guarantees full (or nearly full) payout in cases of formal defaults, but not in the case of restructurings, creditors may be tempted to hold out for a formal default so as to be paid on their CDS. The rationale for including a restructuring credit event in CDS then is to ensure that creditors covered by CDS cooperate in reaching voluntary restructurings that are in the joint interest of debtor and creditors, and do not hold out for their CDS to be triggered by the debtor’s failure to pay.​[43]​ 
Should the debtor country fail to meet debt service payments as due, a failure to pay credit event would be triggered. A repudiation/moratorium credit event would occur if the government were to explicitly commit not to service its existing debt. In either case, the restructuring credit event would fade into the background. However, as far as sovereign debt is concerned, there is no formal bankruptcy procedure. And repudiations/moratoria are extremely. As was explained in Section I, 'voluntary' restructurings, involving at least a degree of bilateral negotiations between the debtor country and its creditors, take centre stage. As a result, the central credit event as far as sovereign debt restructurings are concerned is the restructuring credit event. This is examined in the following Section. 
III. 	The Restructuring Credit Event
Hard credit events (failure to pay and repudiation/moratorium) trigger the CDS automatically, whereas a restructuring credit event needs to be specifically triggered by the CDS protection buyer or seller. Failure to pay and moratorium/repudiation are post-default credit events and thus trigger the protection seller’s payment obligation independent of a restructuring. Failure to pay covers situations in which the reference entity has suspended payments in one form, whereas repudiation/moratorium refers to cases where the reference entity has definitively questioned the validity of the debt. 
Repudiation/moratorium is a credit event that is only included in sovereign CDS and and CDS on corporate debt in developing countries. Repudiation refers to actions taken by the reference entity to contest the validity of debts. Two conditions need to be met. First, an authorized representative of the reference entity challenges the obligation or its validity, or imposes a moratorium, standstill or rollover in respect of one or several reference obligations. Second, a failure to pay (without regard to the Payment Requirement – a volume-based threshold) or a restructuring (without regard to the Payment Requirement) exists in relation to such obligation on or before the critical date for the repudiation/moratorium. 
The restructuring credit event is less of a bright line trigger, compared to failure to pay, bankruptcy and repudiation/moratorium. Originally, the credit restructuring event was designed for out-of-court corporate debt restructurings. In the corporate context, the bankruptcy credit event takes centre stage, and many CDS on corporate debtors lack a restructuring credit event. Restructurings of debt obligations in the corporate context are sanctioned by a court and thus binding on all creditors. In the sovereign context, the bankruptcy credit event is irrelevant. Here it is the restructuring credit that is the most important protective device for CDS protection buyers. It substitutes partly for the lack of bankruptcy credit event in CDS on sovereign issuers. CDS with a credit restructuring event are typically more expensive than those which do not include this credit event.​[44]​ 
The restructuring credit event is chiefly relevant for pre-default restructurings, that is in cases where the reference entity remains current on its debt obligations and no failure to pay occurs. Otherwise the non-payment credit event would be triggered. The restructuring credit event is designed to shield the protection buyer from credit risk prior to the occurrence of a failure to pay or moratorium/repudiation. 
Requirements for credit restructuring events
For a restructuring credit event to occur, all holders of one or several obligations with an aggregate volume of obligations of at least the default requirement (typically US$ 10 million) need to be affected. Additionally, one of the following three alternative conditions needs to be fulfilled: 
	A reduction, postponement or deferral of Obligation principal or contractually agreed interest payments

	A change in priority ranking causing subordination to another Obligation

	A change in currency or composition of interest or principal payments to any currency which is not a Permitted Currency  
 The third alternative condition above refers to the conversion to non-permitted currencies. Permitted currencies are either the legal tender of a G7 country or OECD member countries with at least one AAA rating from Standard & Poors, Moody's or Fitch. As G7 members, France and Italy meet this requirement. Conversion to a non-permitted currencies also does not apply to OECD member countries, such as Finland or the Netherlands, with at least one long-term debt rating of AAA by Standard & Poors, Moody’s or Fitch. 
Apart from one of the three applicable conditions above, four additional requirements need to be fulfilled for a credit restructuring event to occur:
	it must not be expressly provided for in the terms of the obligation at the Credit Event Backstop Date or the issue date of the obligation, and 
	it must result directly or indirectly from a deterioration in the creditworthiness of the reference entity, and  
	more than three holders or at least 2/3 of the holders must be obliged to agree to a credit event (the Multiple Holder Obligation).  Bonds are assumed to meet the 2/3 requirement, subject to them being held by more than three holders, and
	must not result from accounting, regulatory or tax adjustments, which result in the ordinary course of  business 

Deterioration in the reference entity's creditworthiness
The Practice Notes to the 1999 Definitions indicate that the second additional condition above – the deterioration in the reference entity’s creditworthiness – is a limited exception. Restructurings that involve significant face value reductions of creditor claims invariably will fulfil this condition. The purpose of this condition is to leave liability management operations, designed to take advantage of cheaper funding costs or to improve the maturity profile, untouched. It filters out those restructurings that improve the debtor's overall financial condition. The word 'indirect' indicates that the requirement for a causal link between the refinancing and the deterioration in creditworthiness is attenuated. 
In Cemex, the External Review Board was called upon to decide, after the DC had failed to reach the required 60 percent majority for a decision.​[45]​ Cemex rescheduled a part of its debt, stretching out the due date of US$15 billion in bank debt by 1.4 years on average. This rescheduling was binding on all creditors and reduced the net present value of the debt by almost US$4 billion. Six members concluded that a credit restructuring event had occurred. The DC thereafter referred the request to the External Review Panel.  
The three members of the External Review Panel unanimously concluded that a restructuring credit event had occurred.​[46]​ The Panel affirmed that the rescheduling led, directly or indirectly, to a deterioration in Cemex’s creditworthiness. The Panel referred to ratings downgrades of Cemex, audits of Cemex, Cemex’s own submissions to various governmental bodies and regulators, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, all of which pointed to a deterioration in Cemex's creditworthiness. The Panel underscored that its finding was limited to this particular case, and emphasized that its task not was not to rewrite the restructuring credit event, even if had encountered difficulties in applying the law to the facts. 
Cemex shows that the criterion of deterioration in the reference entity’s creditworthiness includes subjective elements that created some uncertainty as to the existence of a restructuring credit event. Translated to the sovereign context, this decision indicates that elements to be taken into account in evaluating whether creditworthiness had changed for the worse include whether the country concerned was downgraded by rating agencies, whether a comprehensive IMF financing package had been granted to the country and whether CDS spreads and the country's borrowing costs indicate a high likelihood of default for the country concerned. 

Whether the restructuring binds all holders
Many debt restructurings involve changes to the terms and conditions of payment. In most cases, the requirement of Section 4.7 Credit Definitions 1999 or 2003 - a reduction of interest payments, principal or maturity, is met, regardless of how the restructuring is designed. Otherwise, the debt restructuring would struggle to reach its goal of closing the gap between the debtor state’s ability to pay and its outstanding  debt to return the country to debt sustainability.
Central to whether a restructuring credit event is triggered is whether the restructuring binds all holders under the 2003 Definitions. However, the boundary between those binding all holders and those which do not is somewhat fluid. In theory, CDS isolate credit risk from market risk; in practice, however, the distinction between the two is not always clear. Debt restructurings take place in this gray area. The only safe basis on which to distinguish one from the other would seem to be formal criteria such as whether creditors are de jure bound to a restructuring. Importantly, the judgment by rating agencies whether a debt exchange is voluntary is immaterial for the question whether CDS are triggered.
Consider the case of the Japanese financial services company Aiful, where a formal corporate reorganisation procedure explicitly provided for the binding effect on all creditors. The Japanese DC decided that a restructuring had occurred on account of Aiful having filed for the Japanese Business Revitalisation Alternative Dispute Resolution process in September 2009. The ADR process had modified the repayment schedules and was binding on all the creditors participating in the business turnaround plan.​[47]​ 
The mandatory character of an exchange under the 1999 definitions
The restructuring credit event in the 1999 definitions is worded differently from the 2003 definitions. The application of the 1999 Definitions hinged on whether an exchange was mandatory. According to Section 4.9, an obligation exchange was a ‘mandatory transfer ... of any securities, obligations or assets to holders of Obligations in exchange for such Obligations.' As an alternative to an obligation exchange, the 1999 definition refer to events which have been ‘agreed between the Reference entity and the holders .... '.
	The application of the 1999 restructuring definition raised some difficulties, particularly in the case of Conseco in 2000. The company rescheduled its debt on terms that were advantageous to its creditors, including increased coupons and new guarantees. Notwithstanding, a restructuring credit event was triggered, and some CDS covered creditors were seen to distort the CDS market by buying bonds at a discount and delivering them to the CDS protection seller and receive par value in return.​[48]​ Some protection buyers delivered longer-date bonds trading at $66 while the short-dated assets they were hedging were trading at over $80 and jumped to par as a result of the restructuring.​[49]​ 
 	Following the experience with CDS in Conseco’s restructuring, CDS contracts without restructuring credit events gained in popularity for US corporations, to give reference entities the scope to restructure out of court with the consent of its creditors without triggering the CDS. ISDA also introduced the modified restructuring clause in 2001 (Mod-R) and the modified-modified restructuring clause in 2003 (Mod-Mod-R) that limited the flexibility of the CDS protection buyer in terms of the securities that may be delivered to the protection seller in case of a credit event to prevent similar abuse in the future. 
In Eternity Global Master Fund v. Morgan Guarantee Trust, the US Second Circuit refused to look at Argentina's 2001 restructuring in purely formalistic terms.​[50]​ Though the terms of the bonds were unaffected, the court focused on what it called the use of 'economic coercion' by Argentina in order to encourage participation in the exchange. It concluded that the exchange was a mandatory obligation exchange under the 1999 Definitions. 
Eternity, the plaintiff, owned three series of Argentine government bonds. Eternity had acquired three CDS from JPMorgan. In November 2001, Eternity accepted Argentina voluntary exchange offer and demanded payment from JPMorgan, the CDS protection seller, on the grounds that Argentina’s restructuring amounted to a mandatory exchange within the meaning of the Section 4.7 and 4.9 1999 Definitions.
In November 2001, the Argentine president had instructed his economic minister to carry out a voluntary debt restructuring with the holders of Argentine sovereign bonds: ‘[T]he MINISTRY OF ECONOMY is instructed to offer on voluntary terms the possibility of exchanging Argentine government debt for Secured Loans or Secured Argentine Government Bonds, provided that the collateral offered or the change in debtor allows the Argentine Government to obtain lower interest rates for the Argentine or Provincial Government Sector.' ​[51]​
The terms of the restructuring provided that the bonds would be held by a trustee for the participating holders, and in return holders received new secured bonds with a lower interest rate and longer maturity.
Morgan contended that the definition of 'Obligation Exchange' under the 1999 Definitions, required that a reduction in principal or interest payments was imposed on the holders, which was not the case in Argentina's voluntary debt restructuring. The district court concluded that one could not speak of a mandatory bond exchange in the given circumstances. First, the court noted the formally voluntary character of the exchange. Second, although Eternity had accepted the exchange offer in return for new bonds with lower interest rates and longer maturities, the original bond terms were unaffected.  Endorsing JP Morgan's position, the court found that no change, extension or delay of principal or interest payments had occurred.​[52]​  
The text of the credit restructuring event under the 1999 Definitions provides some support for the court's conclusion. Argentina's debt restructuring was formally voluntary. Second, it would create perverse incentives from a policy perspective if bondholders could tender in the exchange while demanding payment from the CDS protection seller.
	Eternity Global appealed. The Second Circuit construed the term 'mandatory' more broadly than the district court, and reversed. The court did not rely on the formal criterion of whether the exchange was mandatory, but instead looked at the economic substance of the bond exchange. It held that even formally voluntary exchange offers may be covered by the term mandatory, provided the debtor country had cajoled its creditors into participating.​[53]​ JP Morgan, in addition to its role as CDS protection seller, was also the investment bank that initially advised Argentina on the 2001 debt restructuring. The bank had an interest for the bond exchange to succeed. That said, there are no indications that the court in its decision was influenced by JPMorgan wearing a double hat of CDS protection seller and debt restructuring advisor to Argentina.  
Eternity Global Master Fund v. Morgan Guarantee Trust remains an important precedent for the interpretation of the 1999 Definitions under New York law. Given the modification of the restructuring credit event, it is uncertain to what extent the decision in Eternity v JP Morgan is relevant for interpreting the 2003 Definitions. 
A case regarding the 2003 Definitions has yet to reach the courts. Given the remit of the newly established DCs to determine whether credit events have occurred - this is only likely to happen in cases where financial market participants disagree strongly with the decision of a DC, or alleges that the DC decision-making process was tainted by conflicts of interests. 
Eternity v JP Morgan also provides no guidance as regards the position that English courts may take. However, formalism is likely to play a bigger role in English courts compared to their New York counterparts. In Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson, a 2010 decision regarding the termination of interest rate swaps, the English High Court appeared to lean toward a formalistic approach on netting, and gave great weight to the text of the ISDA Master Agreement.​[54]​ 
In contrast to the Second Circuit in Eternity v. JP Morgan, the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) held that any debt relief agreed to by a creditor majority outside of a formal insolvency procedure could not be binding on the creditors concerned.  It affirmed that majority of creditors could not bind a creditor minority outside a formal insolvency process.​[55]​ This decision suggests that German court are more likely to adopt a formalistic approach, and look primarily or even exclusively to the legal characterisation, rather than de facto consequences for creditors. 
Restructuring under the 2003 definitions
In drafting of the 2003 definitions, ISDA did not explicitly depart from the ruling in Eternity. In part because of the uncertainty on whether voluntary debt restructurings triggered a restructuring credit event, the 2003 definition eliminated the term ‘obligation exchange'. Moody’s, the rating agency, attempted to convince ISDA to adopt Moody's own definition of distressed exchange, to ensure a harmonious assessments for credit restructuring events under CDS and rating decisions, but was unsuccessful. 
Under the 2003 definitions, there are three alternative rescheduling scenarios:
	‘binds all holders'
	‘is agreed between the Reference Entity or a Governmental Authority and a sufficient number of holders of such obligation to bind all holders of the obligation,' or
	‘is announced (or otherwise decreed) by a Reference Entity or a Governmental Authority in a form that binds all holders of such Obligations'.
Moving away from the formulation of ‘mandatory exchange' to being ‘binding on all holders', had an ambiguous impact on the degree of protection provided by CDS as far as restructurings are concerned.  No national court has yet decided on the restructuring credit event under the 2003 Definitions, partly because such determinations now are being reserved for the DCs. But national courts may be tempted to intervene, in particular if there are indications that conflicts of interests may have affected the voting in DC of if they otherwise exceeded their remit to assess the existence of a restructuring credit event. 
  The critical question is whether a bond exchange that leaves the terms of the old debt instruments unchanged would be regarded as mandatory as defined under the 1999 definition or as binding all creditors within the meaning of the 2003 definition, thus triggering a restructuring credit event. A simple bond exchange is unlikely to rise to trigger a credit restructuring event.  
Bond exchanges only amount to a restructuring credit event if coupled with a substantial degree of economic coercion by the debtor on its creditors. The critical element is which restructuring technique is chosen by the debtor country – a question examined in further detail in the next section.  
IV. Which Restructurings triggers CDS?
Early on in the Greek debt crisis, the widespread view was that CDS would be triggered in almost all conceivable restructuring scenarios. Yet a closer look at the ISDA Master Agreement and Definitions, coupled with existing decisions, reveals a more nuanced picture. If exit consents and/or CACs are used to restructure sovereign debt, a restructuring credit event under CDS would be a near certainty. By contrast, a credit restructuring event is much less likely if the restructuring is ‘voluntary' and refrains from heavy-handed intervention in existing bond contracts. For a long time, Eurozone policymakers, intent on avoiding triggering CDS, focused on a voluntary exchange with strong economic incentives for participation – which is close to the design ultimately chosen by Greece for its restructuring in February/March 2012.​[56]​ One of the incentives for creditors participate in the exchange was the statement by the Greek Debt Management Agency on March 6 2012 that Greece ‘does not contemplate the availability of funds' to pay non-participating creditors.​[57]​ CACs that had been retroactively introduced into Greece's existing debt stock governed by Greek law a few weeks earlier, were triggered at the behest of Greece's Eurozone partners, with the goal of a debt to GDP ratio of 120 percent. Ultimately, it proved impossible to navigate the CDS quicksand and return Greece to debt sustainability without this element of coercion. 
Long before a concrete restructuring proposal for Greece was on the table, ISDA turned to the question whether a Greek debt restructuring would trigger CDS. This unusual step is illustrated by a number of statements issued by ISDA​[58]​, well in advance of specific question submitted to DCs. For instance, ISDA announced at the end of November 2011 that a purely voluntary exchange was very unlikely to amount to a restructuring credit event, even if it involved a substantial haircut: ‘The fact remains, though, that the [proposed Greek] exchange is not binding on all debt holders. If you don't like the deal, don't exchange your bonds. Hold onto them. Whether you take the deal of not, you will keep your CDS. Collect the payments on the bond as long as they are being made. If a payment is being missed, trigger the CDS and be made whole. Users of these products know the drill. In fact, it could be a more economic proposition for some holders of Greek bonds.'​[59]​ 
In the lead-up to the Greek restructuring, two questions were submitted to the EMEA DC. The DC unanimously rejected both requests on 3 March 2012. The first request of 22 February 2012 raised the question whether the issuance of a new series number to bonds held by the ECB subordinated private creditors to the ECB in a way that would trigger a restructuring credit event.​[60]​ The second request of 29 February 2012 alleged that the insertion of CACs into the existing stock of debt governed by Greek law, by itself and without being used, triggered a restructuring credit event.​[61]​ 
DCs typically do not give reasons for their decisions, undermining the predictability of the DC process. However, when the DC decided two requests in relation to the Greek restructuring, the EMEA DC took the unusual step of issuing a 'statement' attached to the two decisions issued on 3 March 2012.​[62]​ In the first case, the DC found that the alleged subordination of private bondholders satisfied neither of the two limbs of the subordination test. With respect to the second case, the DC explained that it lacked evidence of an agreement under Section 4.7 (a) to bind all holders under the 2003 Definitions. The DC also highlighted that the Greek restructuring was in the process of being implemented, and that that two determinations did not prejudge the outcome of any future requests that may be submitted as regards the Greek restructuring. The decision is an important precedent for how CDS will interact with sovereign debt restructurings in the future. The ISDA DC decided unanimously that a restructuring credit event had occurred. The net payout on all CDS written on Greece amounted to about 2.5 billion USD.​[63]​ 
How quickly DCs decided on whether the Greek restructuring triggers CDS also mattered. One explanation for the timing of the two requests above prior to the conclusion of the Greek restructuring is that the CDS payout following the restructuring is likely to be significantly lower for those tendering in the exchange because the market value of the new instruments is almost certain to be higher following the successful competition of the exchange.​[64]​ Conversely, this payoff structure is likely to encourage a higher participation in the exchange compared to a situation where CDS had already been deemed to have been triggered prior to the conclusion of the exchange. 
The unprecedented speed at which the Greek debt restructuring was carried out may have even partly been driven by how quickly the DC could find that a restructuring credit event was triggered prior to the restructuring. The DC appeared to regard the day when the restructuring becomes effective for creditors as the critical one.​[65]​ It was reluctant to pass on pending restructuring proposals that lacked sufficient detail, or restructurings in the course of implementation. Given this construction, there is considerable scope for the empty creditor problem to arise in relation to credit restructuring events  for CDS on sovereign reference entities. 
The Greek restructuring of February/March 2012 was conditional on a minimum threshold being achieved. By conditioning the effectiveness of the exchange in this way, the critical date for CDS protected holders falls after the date on which they had to elect whether or not to participate in the exchange. There was also considerable uncertainty about whether the exchange would trigger CDS, which likely encouraged participation of CDS protected creditors in the exchange. An intentional side-effect of the Greek exchange’s was then to minimize the collective action problem in sovereign debt restructurings. There was some scope for the empty creditor problem to arise, as the debt restructuring closed on March 9, whereas the CDS settlement took place ten days later.  
Who adopts the restructuring measures may also be relevant. Should measures to support a restructuring be adopted at the supranational (European) or international level, they may not be relevant measures for purposes of the ISDA Master Agreements. Such measures, by themselves, are unlikely to trigger credit events. They would not emanate from an ‘authorized officer of a Reference Entity or a Governmental Authority' (Section 4.6 (a) (i)) or be ‘agreed between the Reference Entity or a Governmental Authority and a sufficient number of holders of such obligation to bind all holders of the obligation' (Section 4.7 (a)). 
Below five types of restructurings are examined in some more detail. 
1.	A Pure exchange offer
A simple offer to exchange old for new bonds does not trigger a restructuring credit event. Achieving the necessary creditor participation rate with this method is likely to be challenging in most cases. The terms of the bonds remain unaffected, as creditors decide voluntarily whether to exchange their old claims for new ones. A recent corporate example is Anglo Irish’s exchange offer in November 2010. Anglo Irish offered subordinate creditors new bonds in exchange for their existing bonds, with a reduction in principal. 92 percent of bondholders accepted the offer. The bond exchange by itself did not trigger CDS. However, the simultaneous and aggressive use of exit consents triggered CDS (see below).​[66]​ 
2.	Collective Action Clauses (CACs)
CACs bind all creditors to a majority decision, and thereby trigger a restructuring credit event. Under the 1999 definitions the use of CACs amounts to a debt restructuring ‘agreed between the Reference Entity ... and the holder of holders of such obligation.' (Section 4.7a). The 2003 definitions refer in more explicit terms to CACs. Modifications of existing debt instruments amount to a restructuring credit event, provided they ‘agreed between the Reference Entity ... and a sufficient number of holders of such Obligation to bind all holders of the bond' (Section 4.7 (a).
In Ukraine’s restructuring in 2000, holders of debt instruments governed by Luxembourg law were sent the clear message that no better offer would be forthcoming.​[67]​ Ukraine relied on CACs, which rendered the restructuring binding on non-participating creditors. When Uruguay used CACs in its pre-default debt restructuring in 2003, CDS were triggered. Uruguay‘s Samurai bond, governed by Japanese law, contained CACs. Over ninety-nine percent of the creditors representing more than eighty percent of the outstanding principal of the bonds tendered in the exchange and changed the payment conditions with binding effect for all creditors. 
By contrast, the insertion of CACs into existing bonds (as Greece did in February 2012) for future use does not to trigger a restructuring credit event.​[68]​ Admittedly, retrofitting CACs onto existing bonds may well strengthen the debtor’s bargaining power vis-à-vis its creditors considerably. Yet there is no implementation and no definitive modification of creditor rights. The EMEA DC declined to find that the sole act of inserting CACs retroactively into the existing debt stock triggers a restructuring credit event.​[69]​   
3.	Use of exit consents
Exit consents are a powerful tool incentivize participation in debt restructurings. Their use in a restructuring is likely to trigger CDS. The key feature of exit consents is that participating creditors, when exiting old for new debt instruments, vote to change certain non-payment terms of the old bonds. The prospect of the old bonds being thus modified, decreases their economic attractiveness and encourages participation in the exchange. Unlike with CACs, with exit consents there is traditionally there is no change to the payment terms. The requirements of Section 4.7 (a reduction of interest payments, principal or maturity) is typically not met. The case of Anglo-Irish below is unusual, but could provide a template for aggressive uses of exist consents in restructurings. 

Participating creditors could be seen as tortiously interfering in the contractual rights of non-participating creditors. They could be deemed to be complicit in diminishing the contractual rights of non-participating creditors. Exist consents could be seen as a form of economic coercion imposed on non-participating creditors by an implicit cooperation between the debtor country and participating creditors. On this basis, a DC might well conclude that the use of exit consents trigger a restructuring credit event. 
In 2000, Ecuador restructured its bonds by using exit consents. The bonds were governed by New York law and did not contain CACs – foreclosing that avenue of binding non-participating creditors to a restructuring. The Irish bank Anglo Irish also used exit consents in its corporate debt restructuring in 2010 for subordinated bonds governed by English law, and thus triggered a restructuring credit event. Participating creditors, when accepting the exchange offer, changed the payment terms of the 2017 bonds, which allowed Anglo Irish to redeem of recalcitrant creditors with a token payment of 0.01 € instead of the 1,000 € nominal. Participation reached 92 percent. Since the principal payment was thus reduced via a particularly aggressive type of exit consents that effectively greatly reduced payouts to hold out creditors and given that this change resulted from a deterioration of Anglo Irish's creditworthiness, the DC found that a credit restructuring event had been triggered.​[70]​ This decision does not necessarily mean however that a sovereign debt restructuring involving a milder form of exit consents, used for instance to amend a sovereign immunity waiver or to delist the bonds, would trigger a credit restructuring event. 
4.		Exiting the Eurozone and re-denominating existing debt
By itself, leaving a currency union is not a credit event. Sovereign CDS credit events are typically limited to failure to pay, repudiation/moratorium and restructuring. To the extent that an exit from a currency union leads, in turn, to the conditions for one of these three credit events to be present, CDS would be triggered.  
If the debtor country were to switch to a new currency and attempted to redenominate its debts, whether a credit restructuring event occurred depended on whether the redenomination amounted to a relevant change of principal and interest payments due under the 2003 Definitions. The private international law question of whether such a redenomination would be effective with respect to debt obligations governed by a law other than the law of the debtor country is irrelevant for deciding whether a credit restructuring event has occurred. 

Instead, the question is whether the new currency is be a permitted currency under the 2003 Definitions. In the case of Spain, Ireland or Greece, for example, though all three are OECD countries, a newly minted currency would not be such a permitted currency because none of these three countries has at least one AAA rating from one of the three main credit rating agencies. By contrast, Italy, Germany and France, due to their membership in the G7, and Austria and Netherlands, due to their OECD membership, combined with benefitting from an AAA rating from at least one of the three rating agencies, a potential new currency would be a permitted currency. CDS would thus not be triggered.  

5.	Priority to official/multilateral lenders
Whether subordination of private creditors to the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the future European Stability Mechanism (ESM) triggered CDS is uncertain. Should they be given legal priority, a triggering of CDS is likely. 
Under the Definitions, a restructuring credit event can be triggered by a subordination of a covered obligation. However, the DC for EMEA affirmed with respect to the Irish IMF/EU programme that the mere existence of a de facto priority in favour of the International Monetary Fund, based on market practice, did not trigger CDS.​[71]​ The reason for this important qualification is found in Section 2.19 (b) (b) of the Definitions, which contains an important qualification: ‘the existence of preferred creditors arising by operation of law or of collateral, credit support or other credit enhancements arrangements shall not be taken into account, except that, notwithstanding the foregoing, priorities arising by operation of law shall be taken into account where the Reference Entity is a Sovereign.’ 

That market practice establishes an informal ladder of priorities is thus insufficient for CDS to be triggered. So long as the ranking of creditors is not legally binding, no restructuring is triggered (not 'by operation of law'). The conclusion could be different for the ESM, insofar as priority for ESM Treaty envisages an explicit priority of the ESM over private creditors.​[72]​ Nevertheless, one could question whether priority by virtue of an intergovernmental agreement alone, without implementation into domestic law and in the abstract, would qualify as ‘by operation of law'. A related question concerns the timing of when CDS would be triggered in this scenario. The first possibility is that CDS are triggered when the instruments providing for priority enter into force or, alternatively, at the point in time when creditors suffer actual losses by virtue of subordination.  
Determinations Committees (CDs), convened under the auspices of the ISDA, decide whether or not a credit events have occurred. The following final section looks at their central role in resolving credit events, and critically examines aspects of their operation, including their alleged lack of independence from market participants and the lack of transparency in their decision-making. 
V. The Role of Determinations Committees
Parties to CDS have agreed by contract that a credit event occurs only if the competent DC has said so.​[73]​ DCs are the central contractual decision-maker with respect to CDS transactions. Prior to the establishment of DCs, there was a bilateral, ad hoc process among the CDS counterparties to decide whether payment was due under CDS. Now, the determination of whether credit events have occurred is centralized in a single institution, the DC. The importance of DCs is underscored by the Greek restructuring in February/March 2012. The DC found that the use of retroactive CACs in support of the Greek bond exchange triggered a restructuring credit event. As a result, CDS protection sellers on Greek debt had to pay out. 
A case in point is the Austrian bank KA Finanz, the bad bank split off from Kommunalkredit, the Austrian lender to municipalities that was previously owned by Dexia, but nationalized by the Austrian government at the beginning of the global financial crisis starting in 2008. Kommunalkredit and KA Finanz together tendered about 455 million € in the Greek debt exchange in February/March 2012, in the hope that its participating alongside many other creditors would help avoid triggering CDS on Greece. The reason why KA Finanz was concerned about the restructuring triggering CDS was that it had about 500 million € of CDS on Greece in its books that it had taken over from Kommunalkredit. The DC determined that the Greek restructuring amount to a restructuring credit event, and KA Finanz had to pay out on these CDS. As a result, the Austrian government had to inject another 1 billion € into KA Finanz in order to avoid its collapse. KA Finanz accounted for the highest net payouts of all CDS protection sellers on Greece. Unicredit had to pay 240 million € to protection buyers on Greece, and Deutsche Bank and BNP Paribas over 70 million €.​[74]​  
	ISDA established five regional DCs in the late 2000s: (i) America, (ii) Asia without Japan, (iii) Australia & New Zealand, (iv) Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA) and (v) Japan. Among others, DCs are responsible for determining whether credit events have occurred, whether an auction needs to be conducted and whether a security counts as a deliverable obligation. Their legal basis is contractual, namely the ISDA Master Agreement, the Credit Definitions and the DC Supplement. Their operation is governed by the rules of the Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees.​[75]​ 

The authority of DCs
Each market participant is eligible to submit a request to the regionally competent DC. They can submit either in their own name or anonymously in case of general interest questions affecting the market as a whole. For disputes arising out of the ISDA Master Agreement, English or New York courts have jurisdiction. The relevant jurisdictional clause is contained in the ISDA Master Agreement itself, and provides: 'With respect to any suit, action or proceedings relating to any dispute arising out of or in connection with this Agreement ('Proceedings'), each party irrevocably (i) submits
	(1) if this Agreement is expressed to be governed by English law, to (A) the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the English court if the Proceedings do not involve a Convention Court and (B) the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts if the Proceedings do involve a Convention Court; or
	(2) if this Agreement is expressed to be governed by the laws of the State of New York, to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the State of New York and the United States District Court located in the Borough of Manhattan in New York City.'​[76]​
In contrast to the jurisdictional clause in the Master Agreement itself, the specification of the governing law is left to the Schedule that sets out the key characteristics of each CDS transaction. Section 13 (a) 2002 ISDA Master Agreement provides: ‘This Agreement will be governed by and construed in accordance with the law specified in the Schedule.'​[77]​ Schedules negotiated between two parties for CDS transactions are called Confirmation. Section 1 (c) provides that each confirmation is governed by the ISDA Master Agreement, and forms a single agreement between the parties.​[78]​ The default schedule for ISDA provides for either for English law or the laws of the State of New York (without reference to the choice of rules) as the applicable law.​[79]​
	When determining whether a credit event took place, DCs refer only to publicly available information (Section 2.1 (b) DC Rules). There is no possibility of appeal within the ISDA DC process. DC decisions are final. Should the DC fail to agree - a supermajority of 80 percent or 12 out of 15 votes is needed - the question is referred to external review. The EMEA DC in Seat Pagine Gialle referred the question whether the Italian company had defaulted on its debt payments to external review, after it had failed to reach the requisite super-majority of nine out of fifteen votes after three deferments. Eight voting members concluded that Seat Pagine Gialle had defaulted, whereas the seven other members took the opposite view.​[80]​ 
	A considerable advantage of the DC process is the speed at which DCs operate.​[81]​ A good example of its rapid decision-making was the question whether the EU/IMF programme for Ireland subordinated private holders of Irish debt. The DC decided in less than forty-eight hours that no legal subordination had occurred - much faster than courts could ordinarily handle such disputes, with the possible exception of interim measures. There are, however, concerns about the independence of active participants in the CDS market that act at the same time as quasi-judicial decision-makers in determining whether credit event have occurred. In this respect, the appointment process for sitting on a DC is particularly important. 

The Composition of DCs and the External Review Panel
As active participants in the CDS market rather than independent adjudicators or impartial experts, DC members may be tempted to 'vote their own book'. They may be tempted to reach credit determinations based in part on which side of CDS transactions their own firm is on. In the Greek restructuring in February/March 2012, two of the IIF Steering Committee members that negotiated the restructuring of Greek debt on behalf of private creditors of Greece, were voting members on the EMEA DC (BNP Paribas and Deutsche Bank).​[82]​ 
	Membership of each of the five regional DCs is determined on the basis of elaborate set of rules. The Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) annually draws up lists of eligible members globally and for each region, ordered by (notional) trading volumes collected by the DTCC (Section 1.3 Rules). There are separate lists for dealers and non-dealers (buy-side members). Each regional DC is composed of fifteen voting members, ten of which are dealers and five of which are non-dealers. Eight of the ten dealer members are global traders and two are regional traders (Section 1.6 Rules).  
	The non-dealers are randomly chosen from among those on the non-dealer list that have not previously served on a DC, subject to at least one being a registered investment company manager (i.e. a traditional asset manager) and one private investment company manager, such as a hedge fund (Section 1.6 (c) (i) Rules). Furthermore, they must have at least US$1 billion under management, and single name CDS exposure of at least US$1 billion. In addition to the fifteen voting members, three non-voting members sit on each DC. The first is the member next in the global ranking by trading volume that just failed to qualify as a voting member. The second is the member from the relevant regional list with the highest trading volume not already designated as a voting member (Section 1.6 (a) (iii) and (iv) Rules). The third is a non-dealer without previous DC experience, selected at random (Section Section 1.6 (c) (ii)). This non-dealer is considered with a higher priority for appointment as a voting member when the DC is reconstituted (Section 1.6 (c) (B)). 
	Membership in DCs ends with resignation or removal in accordance with the DC Rules. No fixed term limits are set out in the rules with respect to dealer members. Non-dealer members serve one year terms. Failure to meet the global or regional eligibility criteria or failure to participate in an auction or bankruptcy terminate DC membership (Section 1.10). Each member may also resign at any time, though such resignation cannot be limited to a specific list or committee and does not affect service on convened DCs. 
	Concern about the operation of DCs could also centre on the lack of transparency.​[83]​ Even though the corporate affiliations of DC members are known, the identity of the individuals who sit on DCs is not. Nor do they have security of tenure, even though they are empowered to make determinations of credit events with potentially far-reaching consequences. DC members seem to be able to change their representative on the DC at any time, without restriction and in respect of pending requests. 
	In case the DC is unable to reach the requisite majority, requests may be referred to the External Review Panel. External Review involves 'formal arbitration-style briefing and argument, with all written arguments made public'.​[84]​ ISDA members may nominate individuals to the ISDA External Panel List. Appointed members are paid for the service on the external review board, and are subject to a conflicts check. However, the Rules do not contain a definition of relevant conflicts.
   The External Review Panel is less prone to capture by financial market participants with CDS exposures, though it may still be considered insufficiently independent. Though there is limited experience because the External Review Panel is rarely convened, members typically have strong ties to the financial industry. For instance, two of the three members of the External Review Panel in Cemex had been in leadership positions at ISDA for an important part of their career.​[85]​ The DC also has an important role in choosing from the External Review Panel List (Section 4.3 (b). It selects up to five external reviewers (two of them as alternates). If the DC fails to agree, it may delegate the appointment to the DC Secretary, an ISDA official, who will appoint from the list at random. 
Against this background of concerns outlined in this section, it would not be surprising if sooner or later financial participants were to challenge determinations of the DC/External Review panel on due process grounds before the national courts.​[86]​ In cases of conflicts of interest that amounted to the DC not operating in accordance with the agreed terms, such challenges are a distinct possibility. Since their establishment in 2009, no affected market participant has asked a national court to review a DC decision. A potential obstacle to such challenges is that credit event determinations fall within the remit of DCs by virtue of express language in the DC Supplement, rather than the courts that have jurisdiction to resolve disputes arising out of the ISDA Master Agreement more generally. The next section therefore turns to the question of how the responsibilities of DCs relate to the otherwise competent national courts.    
The relationship between DCs and national courts
It is debatable whether DCs exercise jurisdiction in a formal sense. One could view their decision-making as a pure expert determination, that does not involve the application of law to fact patterns. However, the difficulty associated with this view is that DCs apply the contractually agreed credit events to different fact patterns, and reach quasi-judicial decisions with financial implications for a whole set of market participants. They are 'market-wide interpretative' bodies whose decisions are binding on all market participants.​[87]​ National courts will sooner or later be asked to evaluate whether the DC process and its composition meets general due process requirements. 
The ISDA Master Agreement does not explicitly address the relationship between the technical determinations of DCs and national courts. Unlike courts, the decision-making authority of DCs does not derive from a constitutional or legislative grant of authority to adjudicate disputes. The basis for DC’s decision-making power is contractual. DCs are the mechanism agreed by the parties for determining whether a credit event occurred. Unlike expert determination, DC determinations are not purely factual. Rather, DCs apply legal rules relating to the definition of credit events to a set of facts alleged to constitute a credit event. In this respect, the DC process is similar to arbitration.
Unlike in arbitration or litigation, however, there are neither formal parties in the DC process, nor do DCs generally issue reasoned decisions. It is a procedure with only one actor - a relevant market participant who submits a request for determination to the DC. Even though the ISDA documentation is silent on the binding effect of DC determinations, they are as a practical matter final and binding upon the whole class of CDS protection buyers and sellers of the reference entity concerned. As a result, the DC decisions radiate beyond the financial market participant that submitted the original request. The decision has implications for a wide range of protection buyers and sellers, who are not represented in the proceedings before the DC. One could analogize the role of DCs to those of credit rating agencies that involve analysts reaching a reasoned view on the creditworthiness of a corporate or sovereign issuer. In contrast to credit ratings agencies that rate sovereign issuers on the basis of financial and political criteria, however, DCs reach their decisions on the basis of legal rules set out in the ISDA documentation - they are engaged in contractual determinations of disputes relating to credit events.  
As a matter of English law, it is unlikely that the courts would regard the DC's determinations as carved out from the jurisdiction of the English courts. Parties to a contract cannot take the law out of the hands of the courts, to the extent that it deprives the parties of recourse to the courts in case of errors of law. In Lee v. Showmen's Guild of Great Britain, a travelling showman successfully challenged a fine imposed on him by an area committee of a trade union.​[88]​ Such committees had the power to impose fines and other penalties. The basis of the committee's decision was contractual, just like for DCs. The applicant argued that the decision to exclude him from membership in the trade union was ultra vires, and not in accordance with the terms of the powers granted to the area committee.
The Court of Appeal asked whether the area committee had exceeded its jurisdiction. In this context, it discussed the divided jurisprudence as regards the decision-making power of a wide range of domestic tribunals (committees of social clubs, the General Council of Medical Education and various trade unions). Lord Denning explained that the 'jurisdiction of a domestic tribunal, such as the committee of the Showmen's Guild, must be founded on a contract, express or implied. Outside the regular courts of this country, no set of men can sit in judgment on their fellows except so far as Parliament authorizes it or the parties agreed to it.'​[89]​ He noted 'important limitations imposed by public policy', such as the 'principles of natural justice', and the need to 'provide notice of the charge and a reasonable opportunity of meeting it.'​[90]​  
Lord Denning explained that domestic tribunals could by contract be made the final decision-maker on questions of fact. However, they could not be the final arbiter on questions of law, which were often intertwined with questions of fact. Emphasizing that the livelihood of the salesman hinged on the decision of the area committee, the court reasoned that the court would intervene to protect his right to work and supervise whether the domestic tribunal, in this case the area committee, applied the law correctly. It is conceivable that the English courts may exercise a supervisory role of DC determinations on the same basis. 
Conclusion
How likely a sovereign debt restructuring triggers the restructuring credit event in CDS depends on the restructuring technique chosen. The key criterion under the 2003 Definitions is whether all holders are bound to a restructuring or, in contrast, whether participation in the restructuring is voluntary. At one end of the spectrum are purely voluntary restructuring techniques, which will not trigger a restructuring credit event. The other extreme are coercive sovereign debt restructuring where the debtor state employs the full range of its governmental and legislative powers in order to restructure its debt obligations. The use of such mechanisms would almost certainly trigger CDS. The harder cases concern sovereign techniques that fall in between these two extremes, such as the mere insertion of collective action clauses (CACs) into existing debt instruments and formally voluntary debt restructurings, accompanied by significant moral suasion.
There is considerable debate about the effectiveness of CDS as hedges in the sovereign debt restructuring context. Investors nurturing losses despite the economic reality of a default are unlikely to be willing to pay insurance premiums to CDS protection sellers that are likely to turn out to be worthless.​[91]​ In the alternative, potential buyers of CDS on sovereigns are increasingly likely to ask themselves whether it is worth buying insurance for the eventuality of default, if that insurance fails to provide payouts for the most likely scenario for sovereigns – a voluntary sovereign debt restructuring. As a result, lenders could decide to exit a particular sovereign bond market altogether, rather than holding government debt and insuring against default through CDS.​[92]​ CDS may also become unavailable for certain sovereign reference entities. No protection seller may be willing to offer credit insurance for sovereigns on the verge of default, or only at prohibitive prices.​[93]​  
The Greek experience in particular could lead to a reconsideration of the credit restructuring event. Many market participants felt aggrieved by the near failure of CDS to pay out in cases of formally voluntary restructuring negotiations with strong incentives for participation. From their perspective, the decision also came late.​[94]​ Conversely, from a financial stability perspective, the substantial delay to a Greek restructuring gave financial markets time to digest the implications of a Greek restructuring that would trigger CDS. 
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